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| InternetPBX, a product from COM2001, passes the user's voicemail password in clear text over the internet. In addition, there is a minor issue with the way these passwords are stored. |
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Credit:
The information has been provided by Clint Byrum.
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Vulnerable systems:
Alexis Server version 2.1
Immune systems:
Alexis Server version 1.1
Alexis is a Windows NT/2000 and Exchange based phone system that provides many interesting features for helping businesses work in a virtual manner.
First, the voicemail passwords are stored in plaintext, in the NT and/or Windows 2000 root directory in a file called com2001.ini. The impact of this is minor, as the file can of course be protected with file system permissions.
"Alexis Server" has a web access component that links in to Exchange's OWA. It asks for a user's voicemail password before allowing them to logon. This can be secured using SSL, so the password is protected there. Unfortunately, the Alexis web access toolbar opens a java applet that connects back to the server on port 8888(by default). This passes the username and voicemail password in plaintext.
Vendor status:
COM2001 is aware of the problem, and informed that it has been fixed in the next service pack, but they do not know when that will be released
Impact:
Those who could sniff this password could then utilize the Alexis phone system to make long distance calls, or calls pretending to use the phone number of the affected Alexis phone system.
Solution:
Block port 8888 to your Alexis server until the service pack is available. This will unfortunately disable some of the features of the web access, such as call screening. If this is essential functionality, one can downgrade to version 1.1, which does not use the voicemail password in the web access. Further version 2.0 is unable to utilize SSL for the web access and so is vulnerable to similar (and greater) problems.
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