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The FreeRADIUS Server is "a high-performance and highly configurable GPL'd free RADIUS server".
The FreeRADIUS's experimental module rlm_smb allows RADIUS server to perform NT-Domain authentication. This module is not enabled by default and to use it you should compile RADIUS server with '--with-experimental-modules' configuration option. The exploitation of this vulnerability could enable an attacker in the worst case to gain root access on the system. |
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Credit:
The information has been provided by S-Quadra Security Research.
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Vulnerable systems:
* FreeRADIUS version 0.9.3 and prior
There exists a stack buffer overflow in rlm_smb module which can be triggered by a long User-Password attribute (> 128 bytes). The offending code can be found in SMB_Logon_Server routine (src/modules/rlm_smb/smblib.c):
/* Logon to the server. That is, do a session setup if we can. We do not
do */
/* Unicode
yet! */
int SMB_Logon_Server(SMB_Handle_Type Con_Handle, char *UserName,
char *PassWord)
{ struct RFCNB_Pkt *pkt;
int param_len, i, pkt_len, pass_len,a;
char *p, pword[128];
/* First we need a packet etc ... but we need to know what protocol
has */
/* been negotiated to figure out if we can do it and what SMB format
to */
/* use
... */
if (Con_Handle -> protocol < SMB_P_LanMan1) {
SMBlib_errno = SMBlibE_ProtLow;
return(SMBlibE_BAD);
}
strcpy(pword, PassWord);
if (Con_Handle -> encrypt_passwords)
{
pass_len=24;
SMBencrypt((uchar *) PassWord, (uchar *)Con_Handle ->
Encrypt_Key,(uchar *)pword);
}
else
pass_len=strlen(pword);
...
}
It may be possible to exploit this vulnerability under the following conditions:
1) NAS(Network Access Server) does not restrict the length of User-Password attribute to 128 bytes as it is specified in RFC2865.
2) The attacker knows NAS shared secret
The first is probably most simple. However, we will try to exploit the situation 2. In this case, the exploitation is also very simple and straightforward, we should just build Access-Request packet properly and send it to radius server.
Solution:
S-Quadra alerted FreeRADIUS development team to this issue on 24th November 2003. The response from Alan DeKok <aland@ox.org> is below:
"The FreeRADIUS server does not build, install, or use the rlm_smb module in the default configuration. The module is clearly marked "experimental", and is considered to be untested: use at your own risk. Anyone using the module has to go out of their way to re-configure and re-build the server, and then edit the servers configuration files to set up the module. We view this vulnerability as high risk (exploit is trivial), but low probability (few, if any, servers use this module.)
The code in rlm_smb was taken from pam_smb over a year ago, and has not been audited or updated since then. It is therefore subject to the same vulnerabilities as the pam_smb module. This exploit appears to related to one previously released for pam_smb.
The bug has been fixed in the current CVS archive of the server. Any future release of the server will include the fix."
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