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Credit:
The information has been provided by Joshua J. Drake.
The original article can be found at: http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/
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Vulnerable Systems:
* Windows Active Directory installed on Windows 2000 SP4 and prior
According to section 2.4 of the IETF Request For Comments (rfc) 4514, LDAP requests can contain strings that have been encoded using hexadecimal encoding. When Active Directory on Windows 2000 encounters such a request, it fails to release the memory associated with the hexadecimal encoded portion of the request. By continually making such requests, an attacker can exhaust virtual memory on the targeted system.
Exploitation allows an attacker to consume all available virtual memory on the affected system. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must be able to establish a TCP session with the vulnerable machine. LDAP uses port 389 or, when encrypted, port 636. Additionally, LDAP requests are processed when connecting to the Global Catalog Server on ports 3268 or 3269. Although exhausting virtual memory does not compromise the integrity of the system, it can allow some otherwise non-exploitable vulnerabilities to be exploited. As long as virtual memory is exhausted, the computer will not be able to start new programs, or do other tasks that require allocating virtual memory.
Patch Availability:
Microsoft has released a patch which addresses this issue. For more information, consult their advisory at the following URL:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS09-018.mspx
Workaround:
Employing firewalls to limit access to the affected services will mitigate exposure to this vulnerability.
CVE Information:
CVE-2009-1138
Disclosure Timeline:
01/21/2009 - Initial Contact
01/22/2009 - Initial Response
01/27/2009 - Requested PoC
01/30/2009 - Sent PoC
02/09/2009 - MS Status update
06/02/2009 - MS Requests Credit request
06/04/2009 - CVE Received
06/04/2009 - iDefense Requested CVE
06/05/2009 - Microsoft informs iDefense that the Bulletin was promoted to potential Code Execution
06/08/2009 - iDefense requests clarification, offers further insight
06/10/2009 - iDefense reiterates request
06/10/2009 - MS Responds that they agree that code execution is very unlikely and will change the Exploitability Index
06/11/2009 - MS Changes Exploitability Index from 1 to 3
06/11/2009 - Coordinated public disclosure
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