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Credit:
The information has been provided by Secunia Research.
The original article can be found at: http://secunia.com/secunia_research/2008-27/ and http://secunia.com/secunia_research/2008-30/
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Vulnerable Systems:
* Novell iPrint Client version 4.36
* Novell iPrint Client for Windows Vista version 5.04
Immune Systems:
* Novell iPrint Client version 5.06
Novell iPrint Client ActiveX Control "GetFileList()" Information Disclosure
Secunia Research has discovered a security issue in Novell iPrint Client, which can be exploited by malicious people to gain knowledge of potentially sensitive information.
The insecure "GetFileList()" method returns a list of images (".jpg", ".jpeg", ".gif", and ".bmp") in a directory specified as argument to the method. This can be exploited to gain knowledge of any image file names in arbitrary directories on a user's system, including e.g. the user's "My Pictures" / "Pictures" folder without knowledge of the user's username.
Solution:
Update to version 5.06.
Time Table:
20/06/2008 - Vendor notified.
23/06/2008 - Vendor response.
07/07/2008 - Vendor reports that vulnerability has been addressed.
08/07/2008 - Vendor provides new version for testing.
08/07/2008 - Vendor informed that vulnerability is not fixed.
10/07/2008 - Details on vulnerability forwarded.
21/07/2008 - Vendor reports that vulnerability was missed and that a new tracking number will be generated.
22/08/2008 - Vendor issues fixed version for Vista.
25/08/2008 - Public disclosure.
CVE Information:
CVE-2008-2432
Novell iPrint Client ActiveX Control Multiple Buffer Overflows
Secunia Research has discovered multiple vulnerabilities in Novell iPrint Client, which can be exploited by malicious people to compromise a user's system.
1) A boundary error in the Novell iPrint ActiveX control (ienipp.ocx) when handling the "GetDriverFile()" method can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow by passing an overly long string as the third argument.
2) Two boundary errors in the Novell iPrint ActiveX control (ienipp.ocx) when constructing a URI based on input to the "GetPrinterURLList()" and "GetPrinterURLList2()" methods can be exploited to cause limited stack-based buffer overflows via an overly long string passed as the 1st argument.
3) A boundary error in the Novell iPrint ActiveX control (ienipp.ocx) when handling the "GetFileList()" method can be exploited to cause a heap-based buffer overflow via an overly long argument.
4) Various boundary errors in nipplib.dll when e.g. creating a server reference or interpreting a URI can be exploited to cause stack-based and heap-based buffer overflows by e.g. passing an overly long string as argument to the "GetServerVersion()", "GetResourceList()", or "DeleteResource()" methods provided by the Novell iPrint ActiveX control (ienipp.ocx).
5) Boundary errors in the Novell iPrint ActiveX control (ienipp.ocx) when constructing a URI based on input to the "UploadPrinterDriver()" and "UploadResource()" methods can be exploited to cause a heap-based buffer overflow and limited stack-based buffer overflow via an overly long, specially crafted "uploadPath" argument.
6) A boundary error in the Novell iPrint ActiveX control (ienipp.ocx) when copying "target-frame" option values passed to the "ExecuteRequest()" method can be exploited to cause a limited stack-based buffer overflow via an overly long "target-frame" option value.
7) A boundary error in the Novell iPrint ActiveX control (ienipp.ocx) when handling the "UploadResource()" method can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow by passing an overly long string as the 7th argument.
8) Three boundary errors in nipplib.dll within the "IppGetDriverSettings()" function can be exploited to cause stack-based buffer overflows by passing an overly long string as the 2nd, 3rd, or 4th argument of the "GetDriverSettings()" method provided by Novell iPrint ActiveX control (ienipp.ocx).
9) A boundary error in the Novell iPrint ActiveX control (ienipp.ocx) when handling the "UploadResourceToRMS" method can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow by passing an overly long string as the 8th argument.
Solution:
The vulnerabilities are fixed in version 5.06.
Time Table:
18/06/2008 - Vendor notified (1st batch of vulnerabilities)
18/06/2008 - Vendor response.
23/06/2008 - Vendor notified (2nd batch of vulnerabilities)
23/06/2008 - Vendor response.
27/06/2008 - Vendor notified (3rd batch of vulnerabilities)
27/06/2008 - Vendor response.
07/07/2008 - Vendor reports that vulnerabilities have been addressed.
08/07/2008 - Vendor provides new version for testing.
08/07/2008 - Vendor informed that all vulnerabilities are fixed.
22/08/2008 - Vendor issues fixed version for Vista.
25/08/2008 - Public disclosure.
CVE Information:
CVE-2008-2431
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