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Credit:
The information has been provided by Nicob.
The original article can be found at: http://www.novell.com/support/viewContent.do?externalId=3866911&sliceId=1
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Vulnerable Systems:
* Novell eDirectory version 8.8
* Novell eDirectory version 8.7.3.9
Immune Systems:
* Novell eDirectory version 8.8.2
Technical details:
A SOAP interface is available at the "/SOAP" URL. It is usually used through the command-line client "edirutil.exe". This tool enforces access control internally : the user is never authenticated directly on the server, and authentication state is kept locally (i.e. client side). It can by default be exploited to get the full DN, modify the name of the log file, read its content, stop and start eDirectory components ... Additional commands (depending of the server configuration) can be usedto backup the database to a file, allowing full compromise of the directory when combined with the read_logs action.
nicob $> ./eMBox.pl 192.168.1.1 set_logfile c:\\boot.ini
Logger settings changed successfully
nicob $> ./eMBox.pl 192.168.1.1 read_logs
[boot loader]
timeout=30
default=multi(0)disk(0)rdisk(0)partition(1)\WINNT
[operating systems]
multi(0)disk(0)rdisk(0)partition(1)\WINNT="Microsoft Windows 2000 Server" /fastdetect
Note to eDirectory 8.7.x users:
This vulnerability isn't patched in 8.7.3 SP 10. You should instead prevent the EMBOX module from loading (see Novell advisory for details).
Unloading the embox module will prevent edirutil from being able to connect and exploit the ability to perform unauthenticated tasks.
To prevent the module from loading:
On NetWare:
Rename the SYS:\SYSTEM\EMBOX.NLM
On Solaris/Linux:
Rename the /usr/lib/nds-modules/libembox.so.1.0.0 and remove the embox entry in the /usr/lib/nds-modules/ndsmodules.conf.
On Windows:
Rename the c:\novell\nds\embox.dlm and set the embox service in the eDirectory Services to manually start.
CVE Information:
CVE-2008-0926
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