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Credit:
The information has been provided by iDefense Labs.
The original article can be found at: http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=686
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Vulnerable Systems:
* ClamAV version 0.92.1
Immune Systems:
* ClamAV version 0.92.3
The vulnerability exists within the code responsible for decompressing sections within a PE binary packed with the PeSpin executable protector. See the following excerpt from libclamav/spin.c:
417 key32 = cli_readint32(ep+0x2fee);
...
427 cli_dbgmsg("spin: Resources (sect%d) appear to be compressed\n\tuncompressed offset %x, len %x\n\tcompressed offset %x, len %x\n", j, sections[j].rva, key32 - sections[j].rva, key32, sections[j].vsz - (key32 - sections[j].rva));
428
429 if ( (curr=(char *)cli_malloc(sections[j].vsz)) != NULL ) {
430 memcpy(curr, src + sections[j].raw, key32 - sections[j].rva); /* Uncompressed part */
431 memset(curr + key32 - sections[j].rva, 0, sections[j].vsz - (key32 - sections[j].rva)); /* bzero */
On line 417, a 32-bit value is read from the file into the "key32" variable. Then a heap buffer is allocated using the "sections[j].vsz" value on line 429. The "memcpy" call on line 430 then copies data into the newly allocated buffer.
No validation is performed on the "key32", "sections[j].raw", and "sections[j].rva" values before they are used in the memory copy operation. Since these values are under attacker control, this can lead to an exploitable heap corruption condition.
Analysis:
Exploitation of this vulnerability results in the execution of arbitrary code with the privileges of the process using libclamav. In the case of the clamd program, this will result in code execution with the privileges of the clamav user. Unsuccessful exploitation results in the clamd process crashing.
Although it would appear that the following "memset" call will cause a DoS condition, iDefense Labs confirmed that it is possible to bypass this call. This is accomplished through manipulating the file such that the memory layout allows the "sections" structure to be completely controlled via an overwrite by the "memcpy" call.
Workaround:
Disabling the scanning of PE files will prevent exploitation.
If using clamscan, this can be done by running clamscan with the '--no-pe' option.
If using clamdscan, set the 'ScanPE' option in the clamd.conf file to 'no'.
Vendor response:
The ClamAV team has addressed this vulnerability within version 0.93. Additionally, the ClamAV team reports, "the vulnerable module was remotely disabled via virus-db update in March."
CVE Information:
CVE-2008-0314
Disclosure timeline:
03/04/2008 - Initial vendor notification
03/06/2008 - Initial vendor response
04/14/2008 - Coordinated public disclosure
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