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Credit:
The information has been provided by iDefense.
The original article can be found at:
http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=533
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iDefense has confirmed the existence of these vulnerabilities in Darwin Streaming Server 5.5.4 and Darwin Streaming Proxy 4.1. It is suspected that earlier versions are also vulnerable.
Due to insufficient sanity checking, a stack-based buffer overflow could occur while trying to extract commands from the request buffer. The "is_command" function, located in proxy.c, lacks bounds checking when filling the 'cmd' and 'server' buffers.
Additionally, a heap-based buffer overflow could occur while processing the "trackID" values contained within a "SETUP" request. If a request with more than 32 values is encountered, memory corruption will occur.
Successful exploitation allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the running service, usually root.
No credentials are required for accessing the vulnerable code.
The stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability relies on compiler optimizations. iDefense has verified the Darwin Streaming Proxy 4.1 binary release for Fedora Core is not vulnerable. The binary produced from a out-of-the-box compile on Fedora was confirmed vulnerable.
Workaround:
Employ firewalls, access control lists or other TCP/UDP restriction mechanisms to limit access to vulnerable systems and services.
Vendor Status:
Apple has addressed this vulnerability by releasing version 5.5.5 of Darwin Streaming Server. More information can be found from Apple's Security Update page or the Darwin Streaming Server advisory page at the respective URLs below:
http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=61798
http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=305495
CVE Information:
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CVE-2007-0748 to the heap-based buffer overflow and CVE-2007-0749 to stack-based buffer overflow. These names are a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for security problems.
Disclosure Timeline:
* 04/09/2007 - Initial vendor notification
* 04/09/2007 - Initial vendor response
* 05/10/2007 - Coordinated public disclosure
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